The Catholic Lawyer
Volume 2
Number 4 Volume 2, October 1956, Number 4

Article 4

The Goble-Kenealy Discussion - Two Comments
Edward T. Fagan, Jr.

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/tcl
Part of the Catholic Studies Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's Law Scholarship Repository. It
has been accepted for inclusion in The Catholic Lawyer by an authorized editor of St. John's Law Scholarship
Repository. For more information, please contact selbyc@stjohns.edu.

The Goble-Kenealy DiscussionTwo Comments
EDWARD

T.

FAGAN, JR.*

a commentary from the side-lines is in order at this
point in the debate currently featured in THE CATHOLIC LAWYER
between Professor Goble and Father Kenealy.
My first comment reflects my surprise that Father Kenealy, presumably familiar with the viewpoints of Suarez, would depart from them
by asserting, "some [derivative principles of the natural law] do not
share at all in the certainty, universality and immutability of the fundamental principles." '
Admittedly, this position gives some logic to Professor Goble's rejoinder: "Is it immutable or does it change? If it changes, then are not
the boundaries of the rule itself shifted by these variations in time, place
or situation?" 2
The sound answer to Professor Goble's question is found in Suarez. 3
Change may be recognized as either intrinsic (formal), such as when
a father ceases to be a father if he himself dies, or extrinsic (material),
as when a father ceases to be such due to the death of a son. All principles and precepts of the natural law are immutable, according to
Suarez, because they can never suffer formal change. They are liable
to change only in the second manner, that is, to change through changing subject matter. Consequently, there are no real exceptions to the
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1 Kenealy, Whose Natural Law?, 1 CATHOLIC LAWYER 259, 262 (Oct. 1955).
2 Goble, The Dilemma of the Natural Law, 2 CATHOLIC LAWYER 226, 231 (July
1956).
3 As pointed out by another Jesuit, David C. Bayne, S.J., in his excellent article,
The Natural Law For Lawyers-A Primer, 5 DEPAUL L. REv. 159, 186 (1956).
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primary, secondary and derivative principles and precepts of the natural law. What
may properly be called apparent, but not
real, exceptions exist when a material
change has occurred in the circumstances
to which a principle is normally applicable.
Indeed, herein lies the flexibility of the natural law, rather than its error.
My second comment is that Professor
Goble's posed "dilemma of the natural
law," seems to be based upon his and
Father Kenealy's failure to define terms.
Professor Goble has stated:
The universality and immutability of principles of law can either be determined by
objective evidence or they cannot. If they
can be so determined, the whole body of
natural law becomes a system of empirical
law. If they cannot be so determined, then
objective evidence cannot be used to show
the validity of one system over another
claiming the same attributes. 4
Father Kenealy has stated:
The natural law is founded upon the existence of an objective moral order and
the knowability of objective truth. Quite
consistently, and necessarily, it makes objective evidence the criterion of that truth. 5
4 Goble, supra note 2, at 232.
5 Kenealy, supra note 1, at 264.

Obviously both men are not in agreement as to the use and meaning of the term
"objective evidence." The metaphysician,
as exemplified by Father Kenealy, thinks
that the distinctions between form and matter, act and potency, and being and essence
arise out of the world of experience and
have it as their locus. The only way to
know about being is to abstract from what
we experience. By "experience" is meant
what we sense. The rational faculties operate on this sense data, and abstract essence.
These abstractions, since they are predicated upon sense data may properly be
called "objective evidence." The understanding so gained of things in their very
being is the basis of knowledge of natural
law principles.
On the other hand, I presume that Professor Goble would think of "experience"
as involving sense data arranged by reason
in such a way as to enable prediction concerning them. In consequence, he would
rule out the fact that knowledge as to the
being of things can be attained by means
other than faith and would content himself
with conclusions made upon observable
premises which he would call "objective
evidence."

